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STATE INTEREST AS THE MAIN IMPETUS FOR U.S.
ANTITRUST EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION:
RESTRAINT THROUGH PRESCRIPTIVE COMITY
ABSTRACT
The twenty-first century saw a rapid surge in competition law legislation
and enforcement, resulting in higher fines and penalties, some ranging in the
billions. Enforcement of competition law by various governments increased
and cooperation between those governments resulted in the normalization of
competition law enforcement and higher fines and penalties. Beginning with
the United States, many states began to actively seek extraterritorial
application of domestic competition laws against foreign entities. Though this
may have a deterrent effect against anti-competitive conduct, it also has
negative implications for smaller economies that lack the motive and ability to
enforce competition laws. Most, if not all, of the top enforcers of competition
laws had a point in time when their domestic companies could grow with little
to no impediments from strong competition laws. Today, with the
normalization of competition law, smaller economies are given less
opportunities to grow in a similar environment with little to no competition
laws. This Comment argues that although competition law carries with it a
strong moral undertone with certain compelling socio-economic policies,
competition law was formed and developed according to strong domestic
economic interests. These interests do not take into consideration the interests
of smaller economies that might fare better with less competition law
enforcement. Although the U.S. government did try to narrow the
extraterritorial application of U.S. competition law, those attempts were
mostly superficial. This Comment proposes that the U.S. Courts, Congress, and
competition authorities revisit the principle of international comity laid out by
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T.
and S.A. to prevent competition law from becoming a protectionist tool that
protects its domestic interests at the expense of the economic growth of smaller
economies.
INTRODUCTION
Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws has been one of the most
controversial issues in the debate concerning competition laws. Meanwhile, the
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extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws, along with those of the European
Union, Canada, South Korea, and Japan has continued to increase. In 2006, a
Samsung Electronics Company executive from Korea agreed to plead guilty to
price-fixing conspiracy, serve jail time in the United States, and pay fines.1
Furthermore, 2015 marked a major event in the history of antitrust
extraterritorial jurisdiction: the U.S. Department of Justice secured the
extradition of an Italian citizen from Germany for antitrust charges.2 This was
the first time a foreign citizen was extradited to the United States solely for
violating the Sherman Antitrust Act, and the U.S. government praised the
extradition as a result of effective international cooperation for a common
cause of justice.3
Legal terms such as “conspiracy” and “fraud” give competition antitrust
laws a strong moral undertone. However, competition laws throughout the
world, including those of the United States, carry strong economic policies that
preserve the interests of the state. 4 These policies have negative potential
implications for weaker and smaller states, which have fewer incentives and
less ability to enforce antitrust laws within and beyond their domestic borders.5
This Comment will attempt to substantiate these implications by showing
that the increasing extraterritorial application of competition laws is motivated
mainly by state economic interests. Part I will discuss the development of U.S.
antitrust extraterritorial jurisdiction. Part II of this Comment will discuss how
other states began to imitate the American model of extraterritorial jurisdiction
and how they entered into cooperative agreements to enforce these laws. Part
III will show that cooperation between states was motivated largely by state
economic interests and limited to developed states, and that smaller states
and/or less developed states are at a great disadvantage under these global
antitrust regimes. Part IV discusses the negative implications that
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws has on smaller and developing
economies, and further explores the issue through a case study of Korean
antitrust law. Finally, Part V will attempt to provide a solution using the

1 Samsung Korean Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty, Serve Jail Time for Participating in DRAM PriceFixing Conspiracy, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/
press_releases/2006/220464.htm.
2 First Ever Extradition on Antitrust Charge, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 4, 2014), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/first-ever-extradition-antitrust-charge.
3 Id.
4 See infra Part III.
5 See infra Part IV.
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“prescriptive comity” principles laid out by Justice Scalia in his dissent in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A.
I. FROM RESTRAINT OF EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION6
The United States was not always aggressive in its application of
competition laws against foreign entities.7 As discussed below, before 1945,
U.S. courts used the strict territoriality approach to limit U.S. antitrust law
application to domestic jurisdictions.8 However, following World War II, U.S.
courts developed a more liberal approach—the intended effects test.9 This new
test soon met much opposition, and the U.S. courts retreated from the intended
effects test by applying international comity principles. 10 This restraint was
short-lived, however; the courts quickly adopted the substantial effects test,
which is still used today.11 Every time the U.S. courts developed a more liberal
test for broader extraterritorial application, there were important historical and
political developments in the background. 12 This Part discusses these legal
developments and puts them in the context of the historical and political
developments at that time.
A. American Banana: Strict Territoriality Test
In American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., Justice Holmes refused to
apply the Sherman Act to conduct that occurred entirely outside of the United
States.13 The defendant was a New Jersey corporation in the banana industry.14
6 This Comment will not discuss or differentiate between the various types of antitrust laws. For
purposes of this Comment, it is sufficient to know that U.S. antitrust law provisions are primarily found in the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. See The Antitrust Laws, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/antitrust-laws (last visited Feb. 3, 2017). Both civil and
criminal action can be taken under the Sherman Act. See Gregory J. Werden, Sanctioning Cartel Activity: Let
the Punishment Fit the Crime, 5 EUR. COMPETITION J. 22–23 (2009). Cartel activities, such as price-fixing,
bid-rigging, and market allocation schemes are more serious activities that may constitute a felony under the
Sherman Act. Id at 23. The Clayton Act specifies certain conduct not mentioned by the Sherman Act and does
not carry with it any criminal penalties. The Antitrust Laws, supra; see also Thomas C. Arthur, The Core of
Antitrust and the Slow Death of Dr. Miles, 62 SMU L. REV. 437, 447 (2009).
7 See generally American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
8 See infra Part I.A.
9 See infra Part I.B.
10 See infra Part I.D.
11 See infra Part I.E.
12 See infra Parts I.C. & I.F.
13 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 358 (1909).
14 Id. at 354.
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The Court found that the defendant was involved in various anticompetitive
conduct with the intent to prevent competition and monopolize the banana
trade.15 The defendant had purchased the business of several competitors with
provisions against resuming trade and had contracted with other banana
businesses to regulate prices and acquire controlling amounts of stock. 16 It
even created a selling company that sold bananas at fixed prices.17 After the
plaintiff operated a banana plantation in Panama and built a railway in
Colombia, the defendant instigated the Costa Rica authorities to take over the
plantation and the railroad.18 Then, a third party received an ex parte order
from a Costa Rican court declaring him as the owner of the plantation, and the
defendant purchased the plantation from the third party. 19 As a result, the
plaintiff was driven out of business. 20 The plaintiffs alleged that the
defendant’s acts not only affected its plantation operations and supplies but
also drove purchasers out of the market. 21 It could thus be argued that the
primary effects of the defendant’s conduct were felt in the U.S. market, and
that, therefore, the Sherman Act applied in that case.
Despite these actions that clearly violated the Sherman Act, Justice Holmes
applied what was later called the strict territoriality approach.22 Calling it “the
general and almost universal rule,” he explained that the legislation was prima
facie territorial.23 In other words, the operation and effect of a statute was to be
restricted to the territorial limits over which the lawmaker had legitimate
power.24
One might wonder why the Supreme Court did not rule against this
egregious conduct that clearly violated the Sherman Act. At that point in time,
however, it seems that the Supreme Court was concerned that applying its own
standards on other foreign states would interfere with the sovereignty of other
nations.25

15

Id.
Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 354–55.
19 Id. at 355.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See Mark S. Popofsky, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Jurisprudence, in 3 ISSUES
AND POLICY 2420 (ABA Section of Antitrust Law 2008).
23 American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1909).
24 Id. at 357.
25 Id. at 356.
16

IN

COMPETITION LAW
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B. Alcoa: Intended Effects Test
Holmes’ strict territoriality approach did not survive the changing tides of
world politics following World War II. In 1945, Judge Learned Hand in the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied what was called the intended effects
test in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa). 26 In Alcoa,
Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), a U.S. corporation, and Aluminum
Limited, a Canadian corporation formed to “take over those properties of
‘Alcoa’ which were outside the United States,” 27 were involved in a pricefixing and market division agreement, which Alliance, a Swiss corporation,
executed.28 Because the alleged conduct occurred outside of the United States,
the court had to answer the question of whether, with the Sherman Act,
“Congress intended to impose the liability [for such acts], and whether [the
U.S.] Constitution permitted it to do so.”29
Judge Learned Hand held that Aluminum Limited’s conduct fell within the
purview of the Sherman Act. Citing to American Banana, he recognized that
the scope of U.S. laws was not unlimited.30 However, he held that U.S. laws
could reach conduct outside the United States by foreign persons if the conduct
had consequences within the United States that were forbidden by its laws.31
The intended effects test was that the Sherman Act applied to conduct outside
the United States by foreign persons if (1) the person intended to affect U.S.
imports and (2) such conduct had prohibited effects in the United States.32 The
threshold to satisfy this intended effects test was not very high, especially for
the prohibited effects requirement.33 When discussing the actual effects of the

For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according to its
own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of
nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
Id.
26 U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 443–44 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit was
sitting as the court of last resort for the Supreme Court, which had lacked a quorum. Peter Lattman, Law Blog
History Lesson: United States v. Alcoa, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (May 8, 2007), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2007/
05/08/law-blog-history-lesson-united-states-v-alcoa/.
27 See U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.3d at 421, 439.
28 See id. at 421, 442.
29 See id. at 443.
30 Id.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 443–45.
33 See id. at 444–45.
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prohibited conduct, Judge Learned Hand held that the burden was met even
without proof that prices were affected.34
C. From American Banana to Alcoa: A Historical Perspective
This substantial change in law was not completely independent of the
socio-political circumstances at that time. The transition from American
Banana to Alcoa was a gradual one during the period between World War I
and World War II. U.S. antitrust enforcement during World War I reveals that
the increase in antitrust enforcement was motivated in part by state interests
and the Alcoa decision was made in 1945 when the United States had fully
established itself as a global leader after World War II.
In the 1912 presidential campaign debates between Roosevelt, Wilson, and
Taft, the threat of trusts (which are combinations of competitors to create
monopoly power) was one of the leading issues.35 Two years later, the Clayton
Act was passed to further enforce actions against anticompetitive conduct.36
Shortly after this groundbreaking statute, World War I broke out, providing the
Wilson administration with a prime opportunity for antitrust enforcement.37
During the war, German agents attempted to disrupt the export of U.S. war
materials to the allied forces. 38 With the Sherman Act in hand, the Wilson
administration thwarted such efforts by prosecuting the agents under Section
One of the Sherman Act.39
Antitrust enforcement against U.S. corporations looked very different.
Instead of imposing more stringent enforcement pursuant to earlier efforts by
the legislature, the government not only decided to relax its antitrust
enforcement but also encouraged U.S. competitors to collaborate in support of
the war efforts.40 The Attorney General at the time, Thomas Watt Gregory,
went as far as consulting with Chief Justice White to suspend major antitrust
cases until the end of the war.41

34 Id. at 445 (citing Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, which held that no proof of effect on
prices was necessary because an agreement to withdraw a substantial part of the supply from the market would
have some effect on prices).
35 Arthur, supra note 6, at 441–47.
36 Id. at 47.
37 Thomas K. Fisher, Antitrust During National Emergencies: I, 40 MICH. L. REV. 969, 988 (1942).
38 See id. at 988–89.
39 Richard M. Steuer & Peter A. Barile III, Antitrust in Wartime, 16 ANTITRUST 71, 71 (2002).
40 See id. at 71–72.
41 Id. at 72.
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After World War I and leading up to Pearl Harbor, the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice began taking enforcement measures under the
Sherman Act at a record pace.42 The head of the Antitrust Division in 1944,
Wendell Berge, stated that cartel arrangements between German and U.S.
companies had “deprived the Nation of reserves of capacity and skill for the
war effort.”43 Some examples include the division of world markets in military
optical instruments in the Bausch & Lomb case and the cartel arrangement
between Standard Oil of New Jersey and I.G. Farbenindustrie of Germany.44
Alcoa emerged as a major antitrust case during robust anti-cartel
enforcement by the government, when it was more than certain that the allies
would win World War II. 45 With the imminent victory of the war and the
supremacy of U.S. power established in international politics, the United States
was now empowered to protect its market from conduct outside of its
borders.46
In “The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Laws,” French-Canadian
scholar Jean-Gabriel Castel explained that Judge Learned Hand’s intended
effects test did not violate the Holmes territoriality approach because the
effects in the territory themselves could be considered to satisfy the
territoriality requirement.47 In the context of this rationale, Alcoa did not seem
like a farfetched leap from American Banana. Thus, the intended effects test
came to be nationally accepted, and the Department of Justice not only
continued but also strengthened its extraterritorial application of the Sherman
Act. 48 Such aggressive extraterritorial application of antitrust laws led to
significant foreign backlash, which is further discussed in Part II.A.49

42

Id.
Wendell Berge, Antitrust Enforcement in the War and Postwar Period, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 371,
372–73 (1944).
44 Id.
45 See A Brief History of the U.S. Army in World War II, CTR. OF MIL. HIST. U.S. ARMY,
http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/072/72-2/cmh_pub_72-2.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
46 Susan E. Burnett, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. Hoffmann-Laroche? Conflicts of
Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 555, 571 (2004).
47 Jean-Gabriel Castel, The Extraterritorial Effects of Antitrust Law, in 179 RECUEIL DES COURS 32
(1983).
48 Won-Ki Kim, The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law and its Adoption in Korea, 7
SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 386, 390 (2003).
49 Id.
43
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D. A Step Away from the Intended Effects Test
Following much critique and opposition due to the obscurity of the
intended effects test and the overreach of extraterritorial jurisdiction, the U.S.
government and courts began to set limitations by taking into consideration the
doctrine of international comity in the 1970s. One notable judicial decision
was Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., which was
followed by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act (FTAIA).
1. Timberlane—International Comity
In Timberlane, the defendants were sued for conspiring to prevent the
plaintiff from milling lumber in Honduras to export to the United States. 50
Rather than applying the intended effects test, the Ninth Circuit applied an
interest balancing test with “the jurisdictional rule of reason.” 51 The court
recognized that many nations resented and protested the assertion of U.S.
jurisdiction over foreign entities and their conduct outside the United States.52
It found that the Alcoa intended effects test “by itself is incomplete because it
fails to consider other nations’ interest,”53 and does not “take into account the
full nature of the relationship between the actors and this country.”54 Citing to
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which required that each
state moderate the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit
Court explained in a footnote that the “jurisdictional forbearance” in the
Restatement was “more a question of comity and fairness than one of national
power.”55 It provided a tripartite test asking the following questions:
(1) Was there an intended or actual effect on the foreign commerce of
the United States?56
(2) Was the effect sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to
the plaintiff?57

50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57

Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 601 (9th Cir. 1976).
Id. at 613–14.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 611–12.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 613, n.27.
Id. at 613.
Id.
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(3) Are the interests of and link to the United States sufficiently strong
vis-à-vis those of other nations to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial authority?58
While the first two questions are a repetition of the Alcoa intended effects
test, the third question considers the doctrine of international comity to limit
the extraterritorial reach of U.S. antitrust laws.59 The Ninth Circuit listed the
following factors to weigh when answering this question:
(1) “the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,”60
(2) “the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or
principal places of business or corporations,”61
(3) “the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance,”62
(4) “the relative significance of effects on the United States as
compared with those elsewhere,”63
(5) “the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or effect,”64
and
(6) “the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.”65
Subsequent to Timberlane, the Third Circuit in Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congoleum Corp. also took international comity principles into consideration
when determining extraterritorial jurisdiction of U.S. antitrust laws.66 Not all
courts agreed, however. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
Court of Columbia criticized the Timberlane balancing test, holding that courts
were not equipped to weigh foreign policy considerations.67

58

Id.
Id.
60 Id. at 614.
61 Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Burnett, supra note 46, at 574.
67 See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949–50 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
“This court is ill-equipped to ‘balance the vital national interests of the United States and the [United
59
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2. FTAIA—Substantial and Direct Requirement
Unlike Timberlane, Congressional efforts to balance the overreaching
effects of the intended effects test were beneficial only to U.S. exporters. In
1982, Congress amended the Sherman Act by adopting the FTAIA.68
During the passage of this law, two types of entities voiced their concerns
about the developing U.S. law in antitrust enforcement: U.S. exporting
businesses and foreign businesses. 69 Since U.S. exporters clearly fell under
U.S. antitrust laws, they complained that they had to compete with their hands
tied while foreign rivals were not so constrained.70 In other words, they wanted
to legitimately organize collusive export ventures that did not harm U.S.
consumers. At the same time, foreign governments and foreign traders voiced
their concerns about judicial overreach by subjecting foreign businesses and
their conduct outside the United States under their jurisdiction.71
Although the FTAIA on its face seemed like it was limiting the
extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, it was actually protecting U.S.
exporters while allowing the continued extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws on foreign business. The FTAIA states that “Sections 1 to 7 of
[Title 15] shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce.”72 But the
various exclusions it provides substantially limit foreign plaintiffs’ claims
against U.S. businesses while allowing many exceptions for U.S. entities to
bring claims against foreign businesses. 73 The FTAIA seems to restrict the
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the Sherman Act by specifying
that the effect must be “substantial” and “direct” in character.74 However, the
vague requirement that the effect be “foreseeable” rather than intended did not

Kingdom] to determine which interests predominate.’” Id. (quoting In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F.
Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1978)).
68 Edward T. Swaine, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy: United States, in COOPERATION,
COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 3, 7 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011).
69 Edward D. Cavanagh, The FTAIA and Empagran: What Next?, 58 SMU L. REV. 1419, 1420–21
(2005).
70 Id. at 1420.
71 Id. at 1420–21.
72 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006).
73 The exclusion does not apply to “import trade or import commerce” where such conduct has a direct,
substantial, and foreseeable effect on U.S. commerce, and where the person engaged in such conduct is in the
United States. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006). In other words, U.S. antitrust laws do not apply to foreign plaintiffs
when the defendant’s conduct does not have a substantial and direct effect on U.S. commerce, but any claims
against foreign businesses who export to the U.S. fall under the purview of U.S. antitrust laws.
74 See id.
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limit extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws over foreign businesses
but rather caused more confusion for potential foreign defendants. 75 Thus,
whether Congress intended it or not, the FTAIA benefitted U.S. exporters yet
did not adequately address the concerns of the foreign governments and
foreign businesses.
E. A Step Back to the Intended Effects Test: the Hartford Fire Substantial
Effects Test
The division between the Alcoa intended effects test and the Timberlane
balancing test was soon put to an end in 1993 with Hartford Fire Insurance
Co. v. California.76 Nineteen U.S. states and private plaintiffs filed complaints
against domestic primary insurers, trade associations, reinsurance brokers, and
London-based domestic reinsurers.77 The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants
had violated Section One of the Sherman Act by agreeing to boycott general
liability insurers that used nonconforming forms. 78 The actions were
consolidated for litigation, but the Northern District of California granted the
London-based defendants’ motion to dismiss, invoking the principle of
international comity found in Timberlane.79 The Court of Appeals reversed,
concluding that the principle of international comity did not necessarily bar
liability under the Sherman Act.80
Rather than upholding or rejecting the comity concerns altogether, the
Supreme Court held that comity considerations applied only when there was a
“true conflict between domestic and foreign law.”81 Citing to the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations Law, the court held that there is no “true conflict”
if the defendant is able to comply with both sets of laws.82 Thus, the court held
that there was no need to apply the international comity considerations and
instead reformulated the Alcoa intended effects test into a substantial effects
test.83

75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83

See Cavanagh, supra note 69, at 1423–28.
See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
Id. at 764.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 778–79.
Id. at 798.
Id. at 799.
Id.
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Without elaborating on when a true conflict between domestic and foreign
law exists, it is questionable whether the rule has any restraining effect at all.
The decision in Hartford Fire not only failed to clarify the proper test in
applying extraterritorial jurisdiction under U.S. antitrust laws but also resulted
in one of the inherent tensions of the international competition regime.84 Under
Hartford Fire, if the domestic laws of two different states apply to the same
international activity, then both states may have jurisdiction.85 As a practical
matter, of course, the stricter set of laws will always govern in situations where
jurisdictions overlap.86
F. Preparing for Hartford Fire: The Clinton Administration’s Activism
Hartford Fire was decided subsequent to a growing extraterritorial antitrust
activism during the Clinton administration. Prior to Hartford Fire, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) had released the 1988 Guidelines, the Antitrust
Enforcement Guide of International Operations, which proposed that
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be applied only when foreign
anticompetitive conduct affected American consumers.87 In addition, the DOJ
added footnote 159 to limit extraterritorial application of antitrust laws only to
those situations where there was a threat to American consumers by reducing
output or raising prices.88 However, in the wake of Hartford Fire, footnote 159
was repealed in 1992 and the DOJ indicated that it would take “action against
conduct occurring overseas that restrains United States exports, whether or not
there is direct harm to U.S. consumers . . . .” 89 The target of this change in
policy was Pilkington, a British company, which the DOJ claimed had a
dominant position worldwide in the glass manufacturing industry.90 Although
Pilkington did use restrictive licensing practices to maintain its monopolistic
position, the harm was to U.S. exporters in third-country markets rather than to
U.S. consumers.91

84

Andrew Guzman, Competition Law and Cooperation: Possible Strategies, in COOPERATION, COMITY,
Guzman ed., 2011).

AND COMPETITION POLICY 346, 349 (Andrew
85 Id.
86

Id.
Kim, supra note 48, at 398.
88 Id. at 398–99.
89 Id. at 399.
90 Robert E. Litan & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Policy in the Clinton Administration, in AMERICAN
ECONOMICS POLICY IN THE 1990’S 435, 478 (Frankel & Orszag ed., 2000).
91 Id. at 480.
87
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The newly revised Guidelines in 1995 stated that the DOJ would assert
jurisdiction both under the Hartford Fire test in cases involving import
commerce and the FTAIA test for cases of export commerce or wholly foreign
conduct. 92 However, the new Guidelines seemed more aggressive, having a
tone of warning rather than that of guidance. 93 They stated that the DOJ
intended to actively pursue activities that occur abroad and adversely affect
U.S. markets or damage U.S. exporting opportunities.94
Although the agencies stressed that they would take into account concerns
of “international comity,” the Guidelines did not state what weight the various
factors would have in determining extraterritorial jurisdiction.95 Rather, they
stated that when the United States decides to prosecute an antitrust action, the
decision represents a determination by the executive branch that the
enforcement of the antitrust action outweighs any other foreign policy
concerns.96 This shows not only that the Supreme Court’s Hartford Fire rule
failed to restrain extraterritorial application of antitrust laws, but also that the
agencies’ evaluation of comity concerns by U.S. enforcing agencies has been
substantially independent from that of U.S. courts.97
In addition, it is noteworthy that the Clinton Administration was the first
U.S. administration to begin its term after the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War. In his inaugural address, President Clinton said:
“When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and conscience of the
international community defied, we will act—with peaceful diplomacy
whenever possible, with force when necessary.”98 As Alcoa coincided with the
victory of the United States in World War II and its emergence as one of the
main players in the international community, Hartford Fire coincided with the
United States’ emergence as the sole hegemon.
1. Nippon: Criminal Antitrust Extraterritorial Application
Finally, in 1997, the First Circuit upheld the conviction of two foreign
defendants for price-fixing resulting from conduct wholly outside the United
92

Kim, supra note 48, at 399.
Id.
94 Id.
95 Id. at 400.
96 Id.
97 Swaine, supra note 68, at 14.
98 The Legacy of the Clinton Administration, AM. EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
americanexperience/features/general-article/clinton-legacy/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
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States. 99 In U.S. v. Nippon Paper Industries Co., the defendant Japanese
corporation and co-conspirators held meetings in Japan where they agreed to
fix the price of their thermal fax paper throughout North America.100 In its
opinion, the court used language from Hartford Fire to explain that it was
clearly established law that conduct having a substantial effect in the United
States fell within the purview of the Sherman Act.101
Because of the confusing language of the FTAIA, the court refused to give
it any weight and struck down various arguments made by the defendant.102
One of the arguments made by the defendant was the rule of lenity.103 The
court limited the application of the rule of lenity to cases where the Court had
depleted all the sources to discern Congressional intent.104 It dismissed the rule
of lenity defense by stating that it was “well established” that Section One of
the Sherman Act applied to wholly foreign conduct.105 Also, addressing the
defendant’s Timberlane comity concerns, the First Circuit dismissed the
comity principle as merely “an aspiration [rather] than a fixed rule, more a
matter of grace than a matter of obligation.” 106 Thus, extraterritorial
application of antitrust law was extended to criminal prosecutions under the
Sherman Act, opening a new era of criminal enforcement against foreign
entities.107
II. FROM RESENTMENT TO COOPERATION
Following the Alcoa decision, none of the nearly 250 foreign antitrust
actions brought by the DOJ had been dismissed under the intended effects
test.108 As a result, foreign states began adopting “blocking” statutes. Some of
these frustrated U.S. application of antitrust laws by preventing discovery,
requiring foreign courts to refuse recognition of treble-damages awards, and

99

See generally U.S. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 109 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997).
See id. at 1.
101 Id. at 5.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 8–9.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 9.
106 Id.
107 Total criminal fines from antitrust division investigations increased from $369 million in 2004 to $3.56
billion in 2015. GIBSON DUNN, 2015 MID-YEAR CRIMINAL ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW UPDATE
(July 13, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2015-Mid-Year-Criminal-Antitrust-andCompetition-Law-Update.pdf.
108 Swaine, supra note 68, at 10.
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permitting defendants to receive “clawback” judgments, 109 which allow
defendants to retrieve the damages award they paid in their home courts.110
However, members of the international community began changing their
approach; instead of resisting, they began to formulate their own antitrust laws.
Bilateral and multilateral agreements gave rise to cooperative regimes to
harmonize and enforce antitrust laws. However, the effects of these regimes
were limited to common interests between states.
A. Foreign Counteractions against U.S. Antitrust Laws
After the Seventh Circuit Court asserted jurisdiction over Australia,
Canada, Great Britain, and South Africa in a uranium price-fixing case, the
Westinghouse litigation, the foreign states passed blocking statutes. 111 The
British Parliament passed the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents
Act, which “authorized a Minister of the British Government to order British
citizens not to comply with certain discovery requests from foreign States.”112
The Canadian government also adopted a similar blocking statute by adopting
a Uranium Information Security Regulation, which “prohibit[ed] a person from
releasing any written matter or documentation relating to any phase of uranium
mining, refining or marketing . . . unless required to do so by Canadian law, or
by the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources.” 113 The Australian
government passed the Australian Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act providing
that a judgment of a foreign court under antitrust law should not be satisfied if
the Attorney General determined that it was inconsistent with international law
or comity, or was not in the national interest.114
B. Development of Stricter Antitrust Laws in Foreign States
While the United States was initially the most aggressive in expanding the
reach of its antitrust laws, other nations began to reciprocate U.S. antitrust

109

Id.
UK’s Protection of Trade Interests Act allows the defendant “to recover from the party in whose
favour the judgment was given so much of the [foreign damages award] as exceeds the part attributable to
compensation.” Protection of Trading Interests Act 1980, c. 11, § 6(2) (UK).
111 Allan Fels & Zaven Mardirossian, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy in Australia, in
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 164, 170 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011).
112 Castel, supra note 47, at 80.
113 Id. at 83–84.
114 Fels & Mardirossian, supra note 111, at 171.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction. 115 This change in attitude came with the
increasingly global nature of business activity and the realization that
international comity principles posed no significant obstacle to extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws. 116 The continuing liberalization of trade also
encouraged the increasing number of competition statutes among various
states.117
In particular, the EU began not only tolerating but also increasingly
applying extraterritorial jurisdiction.118 Among other factors, the EU’s growing
role as an economic actor contributed to its boldness in applying its antitrust
extraterritorial jurisdiction.119 Today, the EU is considered to be engaging in
“unilateral regulatory globalization” known as “The Brussels Effect.”120
Although the European Court of Justice (ECJ) never explicitly affirmed the
effects doctrine, it developed doctrines that emulated the tests formulated by
U.S. courts.121 The Economic Entity Doctrine was used to assert jurisdiction
over non-EU parent undertakings by attributing liability to them for the illegal
price-fixing by their subsidiaries in the EU.122 The ECJ looked at the extent to
which a non-EU parent undertaking controls its subsidiaries located in the EU
to determine if a single economic entity was formed. 123 Because the court
regarded the non-EU parent and its EU subsidiaries as a single economic
entity, the non-EU undertaking fell within the scope of the EU competition
law.124 The EU also developed the Implementation Doctrine, which is based on
the territoriality principle.125 Under this doctrine, agreements and practices fall
within the purview of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of

115 Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Projecting the Long Arm of the Law: Extraterritorial Criminal Enforcement of
U.S. Antitrust Laws in the Global Economy, 1 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 477, 499 (2002).
116 Id.
117 Jürgen Basedow, International Antitrust: From Extraterritorial Application to Harmonization, 60 LA.
L. Rev. 1037 (2000).
118 Joanne Scott, Extraterritoriality and Territorial Extension in EU Law, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 87, 88
(2014).
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Geradin et al., Extraterritoriality, Comity, and Cooperation in EU Competition Law, in COOPERATION,
COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 21, 27–28 (Andrew Guzman ed., 2011).
122 Id. at 25.
123 Id. at 26.
124 Id.
125 Id.
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the European Union (TFEU)126 if they are implemented within the EU and they
affect trade between member states, regardless of their geographic origin.127
Other states, such as Australia and South Korea, adopted similar
approaches to extraterritorial application of antitrust laws. In Australia,
although the government enacted the Trade Practices Act, which rejected the
U.S. and Canadian models, it eventually adopted antitrust legislation modeled
after U.S. antitrust legislation. 128 South Korea enacted the Monopoly
Regulation and Fair Trade Act (MRFTA), which was also modeled after U.S.
antitrust laws.129 Today, the five most aggressive antitrust enforcement regimes
are found in the EU, Brazil, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.130 The
EU is the leading entity in aggressive investigation of cartel activity. In 2014, it
led the way in cartel fines, collecting over $2 billion.131 In 2002, the Korean
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) made its first decision to apply extraterritorial
jurisdiction in a case concerning international cartels.132 In January 2015, the
KFTC made a record fine of $123 million for bid-rigging.133 For the first time,
it also imposed prison terms on individuals for cartel offenses in 2014.134 In
other states, such as Brazil, the jail sentence for anticompetitive behavior has
been increasing, with sentences sometimes exceeding ten years.135
C. International Cooperative Regimes for Antitrust Enforcement
Along with an increasing application of extraterritorial jurisdiction of anticompetition laws, various states began cooperating and building global

126 Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU introduce rules related to the enforcement of EU competition policy.
Implementing EU Competition Rules: Application of Articles 101 and 102 of the TFEU, EUR-LEX: ACCESS TO
EUR. UNION L. (Sep. 26, 2015), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l26092. It
allows the competition authorities of EU member states to enforce competition rules previously applied by the
European Commission. Id.
127 Geradin et al., supra note 121, at 26.
128 Fels & Mardirossian, supra note 111, at 178.
129 Danny Abir, Monopoly and Merger Regulation in South Korea and Japan: A Comparative Analysis,
13 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 143, 154 (1996).
130 See ALLEN & OVERY, GLOBAL ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 2–3 (2014), http://www.allenovery.com/
SiteCollectionDocuments/Global_Antitrust_Enforcement_2014_(Mid-Year)_Report.pdf.
131 MORGAN LEWIS, GLOBAL CARTEL ENFORCEMENT REPORT: EARLY 2015 1, 3 (Feb. 2015),
http://www.morganlewis.com/~/media/files/antitrust_cartelyearinreviewreport_feb20151.ashx.
132 Kim, supra note 48, at 409.
133 GIBSON DUNN, 2014 YEAR-END CRIMINAL ANTITRUST AND COMPETITION LAW UPDATE 5 (Jan. 8,
2015),
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/documents/2014-Year-End-Criminal-Antitrust-andCompetition-Law-Update.pdf.
134 MORGAN LEWIS, supra note 131, at 8.
135 See id.
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antitrust regimes. This movement began after World War II, when states
attempted to achieve harmonization through multilateral agreements and
international organizations.
In 1947, the Havana Charter and the International Trade Organization
began contemplating adding provisions for the regulation of business
practices. 136 In the early 1950s, the United Nations (U.N.) Economic and
Social Council continued discussions on formulating an international
agreement on business practices as well. However, these international
endeavors were rejected by the United States. 137 Although the “Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices” was adopted in 1980 with the efforts of
developing countries, it did not have much meaningful effect due to the
voluntary nature of the code.138
The formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in the 1990s
reignited efforts to harmonize antitrust laws and enforcement. 139 This time,
leaders of the European Commission tried to incorporate competition law into
the WTO regime, but failed due to opposition from both developing countries
and the United States. 140 Following years of failed negotiations, the WTO
decided not to hold discussions on competition law.141
However, the stalemate for international cooperation was broken with the
strong support of U.S. interests through a different strategy.142 In 1997, U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno and Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Joel
Klein formed the International Competition Policy Advisory Committee
(ICPAC).143 This committee was commissioned to address worldwide antitrust
problems and issued a report advising the creation of a “Global Competition
Initiative” to realize a greater convergence of competition law, analysis, and
common culture. 144 At the anniversary of the European Council Merger
136 Damien Geradin, The Perils of Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust and the Risks of
Overregulation of Competitive Behavior, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 189, 193 (2010).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 David J. Gerber, Economic Development and Global Competition Law, in COMPETITION LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT 13, 16 (D. Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013).
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 History, INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/about/
history.aspx (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
144 Id.
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Control Regulation in 2000, Mario Monti, then-European Commissioner for
Competition, and Joel Klein expressed their support for the initiative. 145
Finally, in 2001, top officials from Australia, Canada, the EU, France,
Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and Zambia launched the International Competition Network
(ICN).146
One of the main features of the ICN is that participation is voluntary.147
Although almost all of the competition authorities in the world are represented
in the ICN,148 ICN initiatives and cooperation will only be effective when the
case involves jurisdictions without contradictory interests. The voluntary
nature of the ICN and the bilateral agreements discussed below are all efforts
initiated by states with power to coordinate a more effective competition law
enforcement regime according to the standards of each respective state.
The United States continued to build an international community that
would help support its competition law initiatives by entering into bilateral and
regional agreements with other nations, rather than using international
organizations as a forum for discussion. Initially, the United States was not
receptive to cooperation with other states,149 as evidenced by its rejection of
the recommendation of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) in 1967 to limit state enforcement actions in light of
legitimate foreign interests. 150 Today, the United States has entered into
anticompetitive bilateral agreements with Australia, Brazil, Canada, the
European Union, Germany, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and Russia.151 Mutual legal
assistance treaties (MLATs) are other important tools of cooperation. 152
MLATs are bilateral agreements, which provide that each party will use its
own criminal investigative resources to obtain information for an investigation
being conducted by the other party.153 To date, the United States has entered
145

Id.
Id.
147 Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by
Small and Developing Jurisdictions, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 10 (2010) [hereinafter Gal, Antitrust].
148 Id.
149 Swaine, supra note 68, at 15.
150 Id.
151 Antitrust Cooperation Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/antitrustcooperation-agreements (last updated Aug. 17, 2016).
152 Brinkley Tappan & Stephen M. Byers, Exporting US Antitrust Law: The DOJ’s Increasing Focus on
Asia, 28 CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2003), https://www.crowell.com/files/Exporting-US-Antitrust-Law-The-DOJsIncreasing-Focus-on-Asia.pdf.
153 Id.
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into an MLAT agreement with twenty-six different states, including Australia,
Canada, Japan, South Korea, and the UK.154 There have also been cooperative
efforts on a regional level. Some of the most notable multilateral agreements
are the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), where the United States is
a key participant, and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).155
These agreements have gone beyond written form into action. Some of these
coordinated efforts include cooperative dawn raids and the execution of search
warrants in multiple jurisdictions.156
Nonetheless, these agreements did not play a major role in harmonizing
antitrust policies, but instead acted mostly as non-binding agreements.157 And
even those agreements that were binding only had some rudimentary coverage
of competition policy matters. 158 Most importantly, these international
agreements were not effective in restraining extraterritorial jurisdiction, but
they did support cooperative efforts that were aimed towards reinforcing each
state’s interest by sharing information, coordinating dawn raids, and executing
multi-jurisdictional search warrants.159 The nature of these agreements shows
that international cooperation in antitrust laws is not motivated by a desire of
restraint, but by a desire to effectively enforce each state’s own antitrust laws.
In other words, international anti-competitive cooperation is realized by the
gathering of various states that have common interests in preventing similar
“anti-competitive” actions.
III. COMMON INTERESTS UNDER THE VEIL OF COOPERATION
The best examples that reflect state economic interests as a priority in
antitrust laws and policy are the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and
GE/Honeywell mergers. In both cases, the European Commission blocked the
mergers between two U.S. companies after the U.S. government cleared the
merger. While both governments gave evidence supporting their decisions, the
conflicting decisions did not merely come from differing policies in antitrust
laws.

154 2012 INCSR: Treaties and Agreements, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE (Mar. 7, 2012), http://www.state.gov/j/
inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm.
155 Annex 1-C, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atr/annex-1-c (last updated June 25, 2015).
156 Tappan & Byers, supra note 152, at 2.
157 Annex 1-C, supra note 155.
158 Id. at 7.
159 Id. at 8; Tappan & Byers, supra note 152, at 2.
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A. Boeing/McDonnell
In December 1996, the Boeing Company announced its plans to acquire
McDonnell Douglas. 160 The merger would make Boeing the sole American
manufacturer of commercial-jet aircrafts and the United States’ second largest
defense contractor, and would also increase its market share to two-thirds of
the worldwide market.161 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) reviewed the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, and after a lengthy investigation, decided
not to challenge the merger.162 The FTC published a brief explanation on July
1, 1997, stating that “the acquisition would not substantially lessen
competition . . . in either defense or commercial aircraft markets.” 163 It also
found that McDonnell Douglas would no longer constitute a meaningful
competitive force, and that there was no other economically plausible strategy
that it could follow.164 The brief concluded that after a lengthy and detailed
investigation, the FTC found that McDonnell Douglas was no longer in a
position to significantly influence the competitive dynamics of the commercial
aircraft market.165
On the other hand, the European Commission (EC) did not view the merger
so benignly and objected to it in May 1997. 166 On July 4, 1997, a fifteenmember advisory panel unanimously recommended that the EC block the
merger. 167 The EC was concerned that the merger would increase Boeing’s
customer base from sixty percent to eighty-four percent of the worldwide
market share.168 It believed that the merger would give Boeing an increased
advantage in negotiating with customers for exclusive supply arrangements
and enhanced access to government-funded research and development. 169

160 Salil K. Mehra, Extraterritorial Antitrust Enforcement and the Myth of International Consensus, 10
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 191, 212 (1999).
161 Id.
162 Eric J. Stock, Explaining the Differing U.S. and EU Positions on the Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas
Merger: Avoiding Another Near-Miss, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 825, 840 (1999).
163 Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. Steigner, Roscoe B. Starek, III
and Christine A. Varney in the Matter of the Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation, Fed. Trade
Commission (July 1, 1997), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1997/07/statement-chairman-robertpitofsky-commissioners-janet-d-steiger-roscoe-b [hereinafter Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky et al.];
Mehra, supra note 160, at 212.
164 Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky et al., supra note 163; Mehra, supra note 160, at 212–13.
165 Mehra, supra note 160, at 213.
166 Id.
167 Stock, supra note 162, at 840–41.
168 Mehra, supra note 160, at 213.
169 Id. at 213–14.
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Heated negotiations and political debates ensued, and President Clinton
threatened the EU, stating that the United States would impose trade sanctions
if it decided to block the merger.170 Fortunately, the EC decided to approve the
merger following several concessions made by Boeing during settlement,
which required Boeing to significantly change the future operation of the
company to avoid sanctions and litigation.171
Some simply dismiss the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger as a result of
different philosophies and assumptions. 172 However, others, namely U.S.
officials, saw other concerns at work during negotiations with the EC: 173
Airbus Industries, Boeing’s major (and subsequently only) competitor, had
been subsidized by four governments of the EC’s member states.174
B. GE/Honeywell
Four years after the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas feud, the EC once again
rejected—this time completely—the GE-Honeywell merger subsequent to the
approval of U.S. regulators.175 General Electric (GE) was the world’s largest
jet engine producer for commercial and military aircraft, while Honeywell was
the leading producer of aerospace products.176 After the United States gave a
green light to the world’s largest proposed merger between GE and Honeywell,
the EC stopped the deal from going through.177
Among other things, the EC raised concerns of bundling,178 which is the
practice of mixing multiple product lines and offering financial incentives to
customers to purchase the whole package.179 In response to the EC’s decision,
the U.S. Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division issued
a press release stating that bundling was an efficiency-promoting activity that

170

Stock, supra note 162, at 841.
Id.
172 Stock, supra note 162, at 863.
173 Mehra, supra note 160, at 214.
174 Id. at 214–15.
175 See generally David S. Evans & Michael Salinger, Competition Thinking at the European
Commission: Lessons from the Aborted GE/Honeywell Merger, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 489 (2002).
176 Eleanor M. Fox, Mergers in Global Markets: GE/Honeywell and the Future of Merger Control, 23 U.
PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 457, 460 (2002).
177 Id. at 461–63.
178 Id. at 461–62.
179 Barbara T. Sicalides, United States Antitrust Law Related to Bundling, Loyalty Discounts and Slotting
Allowances, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP (Oct. 5, 2007), http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/united-statesantitrust-law-related-to-bundling-loyalty-discounts-and-slotting-allowances-2007-10-05/#_ftn6.
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would lower the prices of the products and benefit consumers.180 However, the
EC argued that prices would be lowered only in the short-term and eventually
rise thereafter. 181 Behind the scenes of these inter-governmental exchanges,
Rolls Royce and United Technologies were involved in a ferocious lobby
against the merger, once again showing the influence of state or regional
economic interest in major antitrust decisions.182
IV. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN A NINETEENTH CENTURY NATION-STATE
A. Small Economies Not Only Lack the Resources to Promulgate and Enforce
Antitrust Laws, but Also Lack the Incentives To Do So
The sequence of events during the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas negotiations
and its outcome is not surprising. Although globalization of business has
significantly changed, the fundamental political paradigm of international
politics has not changed since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, in which
states act as individual entities acting in their own interests.183 The nature of
the international agreements made between the states and the
Boeing/McDonnell Douglas and GE/Honeywell negotiations show that state
interest is the main impetus for negotiations and agreements. 184 Thus,
international cooperation cannot be an effective restraint on extraterritorial
application of antitrust laws. Cooperation through bilateral and multilateral
agreements is usually voluntary,185 which has certain implications. First, each
country chooses the countries it wants to cooperate with. 186 Second, the
agreements generally give each party the right to decide whether it will
cooperate on a case-by-case basis. 187 However, small economies, including
developing states, feel the biggest and most negative impact as a result of
cooperation motivated by economic state interest; these states have less interest
in applying antitrust laws domestically and extraterritorially and lack the
power and ability to enforce such antitrust laws.
180

Fox, supra note 176, at 463.
Id. at 464–65.
182 Michael Elliott, The Anatomy of the GE-Honeywell Disaster, TIME (July 8, 2001),
http://content.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,166732,00.html.
183 Ellis, Jr., supra note 115, at 477; see Philip G. Cerny, Globalization and Other Stories: The Search for
a New Paradigm for International Relations, 51 INT’L J. 617–23 (1995–1996).
184 See generally Mehra, supra note 160; Evans & Salinger, supra note 175.
185 Frederic Jenny, International Cooperation on Competition: Myth, Reality, and Perspective,
ANTITRUST BULL., Winter 2003, at 973, 979.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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Small economies are also disadvantaged in that they do not have the proper
resources to be a credible threat to international cartels in enforcing antitrust
laws. 188 According to a study conducted by Abel Mateus, many countries
around the world, including developed countries, did not provide enough
resources for the respective National Competition Authorities (NCA) for
effective competition law enforcement.189 Not only is a GDP per capita above
$13,500 required for an effective competition law enforcement regime, but
such regimes are only necessary with a GDP per capita above $3,500.190 This
means that competition law enforcement may impose heavy costs on the
country, while the loss may be minimal to a given business.191
Small economies with limited ability and resources to govern conduct of
foreign firms usually only have the power to deny access to domestic
markets.192 In addition, if trade in a small economy is only a fraction of the
foreign firm’s global operations, the foreign firm will be less reluctant to
withdraw its business from the country.193 Thus, the negative effects on the
small economy might be greater than the negative effects the foreign firm
might feel while continuing operations within the small economy’s borders.194
With this in mind, large foreign importers often explicitly or implicitly threaten
to exit the small economy when the small economy attempts to impose
limitations upon them under anti-competition laws.195
Michal S. Gal conducted an empirical study that supports the view that
smaller and developing countries lack the power and incentives to enforce
competition laws.196 According to the study, sixty-nine percent of small and
developing jurisdictions did not bring any monopolization charges against
foreign firms.197 Nineteen percent brought only three or fewer suits, and only

188

Gal, Antitrust, supra note 147, at 3.
Abel Mateus, Competition and Development, in COMPETITION LAW AND DEVELOPMENT 115, 136 (D.
Daniel Sokol et al. eds., 2013).
190 Id. These numbers were reached using the World Bank Governance data, the database on institutions
and policy from the Inter-American Development Bank, the World Bank Doing Business database, the Global
Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Report 2010–2011, and various data available from the World
Bank. Id. at 129–32.
191 See Andrew T. Guzman, Competition Law and Cooperation, in COOPERATION, COMITY, AND
COMPETITION POLICY 345, 345–46 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011).
192 Id. at 346.
193 Gal, Antitrust, supra note 147, at 31–32.
194 Id.
195 Id. at 32.
196 See id. at 31–37.
197 Id. at 25.
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eleven percent brought more than three cases of monopolization charges
against foreign firms in the course of five years.198
Although this threat imposed by large firms upon small economies is not
common, Microsoft’s reaction to Israel’s competition requirements shows the
disadvantage that small economies have against large firms: Microsoft refused
to enter into agreements with Israel despite the fact that it entered into similar
agreements with the EU.199 Unfortunately, the implied threat of Microsoft’s
exit from Israel had far more dire consequences to Israel than to Microsoft—
Microsoft would have suffered a loss in profits, while Israel would have been
left with no Hebrew-supported operating systems. 200 The weak enforcement
regimes of smaller economies as well as their lack of motivation to enforce
competition law may make them a likely target for international cartels.
The threat of competition law enforcement on large firms is not limited to
international cartels. Many developing countries have an economy based on a
small group of elites.201 This means that the enforcement of competition law on
some of the firms may result in loss of funding if it affects those who have
strong political ties with the government. 202 Many large foreign firms even
have strong ties with high-ranking government officials and the business elite,
sometimes resulting in political pressure against the implementation of
competition law against these entities.203
There is no doubt that small economies benefit from the strict
extraterritorial application of anti-competition laws on foreign firms by “freeriding.”204 Yet, at the same time, smaller economies have very little power to
improve their bargaining position during negotiations of international
agreements on anti-competition laws, resulting in agreements that usually
favor the interests of larger countries.205 That is why small economies remain
marginal and passive players in the global antitrust regime, forced to bear the
198 Id. The major outlier among smaller and developing countries was Zambia. However, the Zambian
government brought such actions to receive concessions in order to reduce prices or change trading conditions.
Id.
199 Michal S. Gal, Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust—The Case of a Small Economy, in
COOPERATION, COMITY, AND COMPETITION POLICY 97, 114 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., 2011) [hereinafter Gal,
Extraterritorial Application].
200 Gal, Antitrust, supra note 147, at 32–33.
201 KISHWAR SULTANA, THE ROLE OF ELITES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 5 (2009).
202 See Gal, Antitrust, supra note 147, at 36–37.
203 Id.
204 Gal, Extraterritorial Application, supra note 199, at 116.
205 Id. at 118.
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effects of international anticompetitive conduct and enforcement actions of
larger economies—whether good or bad.206
Small economies are not only weaker players in the global antitrust regime,
but also may sometimes be excluded from cooperation. There are very few
agreements between developed and developing countries, as shown in a 2001
OECD questionnaire, answered by thirteen members and twelve
nonmembers. 207 The Secretariat’s observations showed that cooperation was
limited only to particular states, mostly those that shared common systems or
concepts or cartel activity, such as the European Commission and EU member
states, Canada, and the United States.208
It is noteworthy that many states that aggressively apply extraterritorial
antitrust laws and cooperate with the United States are both top ten exporters
and top ten importers with the United States.209 This phenomenon is not only
attributed to the lack of resources and incentives for the smaller economies, but
also to the potential reluctance of larger economies to enter into cooperative
agreements with these smaller economies. Larger international firms from
larger economies usually have higher market shares than the smaller firms in
smaller economies. 210 Thus, the larger economies might be exposed to
numerous requests for assistance while they will not benefit as much from the
agreement as smaller economies.211 This means that larger jurisdictions will
probably be reluctant to enter into cooperative agreements with smaller
economies because of the probability that their larger firms might be subject to
investigation by the competition authorities of smaller economies.212
B. South Korea: From a Developing Country to a Developed Country—Prior
to International Normalization of Antitrust Laws
While the case of smaller and developing countries still remains largely a
theoretical concern, the specific case of South Korea provides useful insight.

206

Id. at 98.
Jenny, supra note 185, at 990.
208 Id. at 990–91.
209 Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, and South Korea are top players in anti-cartel
enforcement and are among both the top ten exporters and the top ten importers with the United States. See
United States Trade Statistics, GLOBALEDGE, http://globaledge.msu.edu/countries/united-states/tradestats (last
visited Feb. 3, 2017); ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 130, at 3–6, 9–10.
210 Jenny, supra note 185, at 979.
211 See id.
212 Id.
207
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South Korea is a small country with a land mass of 38,691 square miles—
which is only about twenty percent of the total land mass of California.213
Despite its size, South Korea transformed from a foreign aid recipient after the
Korean War to the eleventh largest economy in the world in 2006. 214 In
addition, it has one of the most active antitrust enforcement mechanisms,
ranking fourth in terms of highest global cartel fine levels.215 Many refer to this
rags-to-riches growth as the “Miracle on the Han River.”216 One of the reasons
for the economic success of South Korea is attributable to the government’s
planned economic efforts that resulted in the creation and establishment of
chaebols, Korea’s big business conglomerates. 217 Korea’s economic success
through the creation and dominance of chaebols, as well as its subsequent
implementation of antitrust laws, illustrates how growing antitrust enforcement
and cooperation mechanisms may not actually be beneficial for developing
countries, as the U.S. government often claims.
In the early 1950s, South Korea was a war-torn country that relied heavily
on foreign aid for survival.218 With the few assets that were left by Japanese
colonialists, South Korean businessmen started new businesses that helped
rebuild the country.219 As Park Chung Hee installed himself as the leader of the
military-dominated regime, he quickly implemented a series of five-year plans
to achieve economic prosperity.220 The government was deeply involved in the
financial structure of South Korea. It specifically decided which markets it
would develop through certain firms and focused on export-oriented

213 How Big is South Korea in Comparison to the United States, Germany, Japan and UK?, TRAVELER’S
DIGEST (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.travelersdigest.com/7040-how-big-is-south-korea-in-comparison-to-theunited-states-germany-japan-uk/.
214 Facts About South Korea, KOREA ECON. INST. AM. (June 2014), http://keia.org/sites/default/files/
publications/kei_factsonkorea_june2014.pdf; see Richard Dobbs & Roland Villinger, Four Steps to Prosperity,
in SOUTH KOREA: FINDING ITS PLACE ON THE WORLD STAGE (McKinsey & Co. 2010),
http://www.mckinsey.com/global-themes/asia-pacific/south-korea-finding-its-place-on-the-world-stage.
215 See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 130, at 2.
216 Wonsik Choi & Richard Dobbs, Renewing the South Korean Miracle, MCKINSEY & COMPANY (Feb
22, 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/mgi/overview/in-the-news/renewing-the-south-korean-miracle.
217 See generally DAVID MURILLO & YUN-DAL SUNG, ESADEGEO, UNDERSTANDING KOREAN
CAPITALISM: CHAEBOLS AND THEIR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 1 (Sept. 2013).
218 See Carter J. Eckert, Korea’s Economic Development in Historical Perspective, 1945-1990, in PACIFIC
CENTURY 292–93 (M. Borthwick ed., 1992).
219 Charlotte Marguerite Powers, The Changing Role of Chaebol, 10 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 105, 106
(Summer 2010).
220 EDWARD M. GRAHAM, REFORMING KOREA’S INDUSTRIAL CONGLOMERATES 14–16 (2003) https://
piie.com/publications/chapters_preview/341/2iie3373.pdf; Park Chung Hee, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Park-Chung-Hee (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
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industrialization.221 The government also provided various financial incentives,
such as low-interest loans and tax breaks, to businesses that were willing to
adhere to its official development programs. 222 Firms that were carefully
selected by the government to receive preferential treatment grew to become
the conglomerate chaebols, and they were left to themselves as long as they
followed the government’s development plans and created jobs. 223
Industrialization through the chaebols brought about significant economic
growth, resulting in an annual economic growth of ten percent by 1971.224
With the rise and dominance of the chaebols, South Korea repeated the
United States’ experience when the public began to recognize the need to
contain monopolistic and oligopolistic behavior. 225 To address this public
outcry, the government drafted a new competition law in 1964 to regulate
prices and contract terms.226 However, this bill was met with strong objections
from the business sector.227 Government efforts to pass antitrust laws persisted
as antitrust bills were submitted in 1966, 1967, and 1971, all of which failed to
pass the majority threshold or even reach the National Assembly.228 Finally,
the first set of antitrust laws, the MRFTA, was enacted in 1980. 229
Unfortunately, the MRFTA did not alleviate the increasing economic
concentration—in two years, the number of chaebols with assets over 400
billion Korean Won increased from thirty-two to forty-three.230
It was not until the Asian financial crisis of 1997 that the MRFTA had a
significant impact on antitrust regulation. During the crisis, the South Korean
banking sector collapsed and the chaebols had to turn to the government for
help. 231 To deal with the crisis, the government turned to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) for a fifty-seven billion dollar loan, but with certain
conditions, including trade liberalization and the reform of the MRFTA.232 The
time was ripe for this transition into actual enforcement of antitrust laws
221

Eckert, supra note 218, at 296; Powers, supra note 219, at 106–07.
Powers, supra note 219, at 106.
223 Id. at 106–07.
224 Youngjin Jung & Seung Wha Chang, Korea’s Competition Law and Policies in Perspective
Symposium on Competition Law and Policy in Developing Countries, NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 687, 688 (2006).
225 Id. at 690.
226 Id.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 690–91.
229 Id. at 691.
230 Id. at 693.
231 See id. at 694.
232 See id.; MURILLO & SUNG, supra note 217, at 5.
222
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because of the public perception that the chaebols were the main cause of the
financial crisis. 233 Since then, South Korea has reached the forefront of
antitrust enforcement, becoming one of the few countries to impose fines on
the international vitamin cartel case, which involved Hoffman-La Roche.234
An overview of South Korea’s economic and legal development reveals
that the main thrust behind the promulgation and enforcement of antitrust laws
is state economic interests. It also shows that the timing of antitrust law
enactment is an important factor for sound economic development as well as
effective enforcement. Pressures for trade liberalization and antitrust law
enforcement on South Korea did not emerge until the IMF crisis in 1997,
allowing the country to grow into a manufacturing and exporting powerhouse.
This was made possible by the protectionist and “anticompetitive” policies that
helped nurture and incubate businesses, or chaebols, that would later become
resilient in the global market.235 After the chaebols reached a certain growth,
owning up to forty-five percent of the Korean market, these conglomerates had
the ability to withstand the strict antitrust enforcements levied by the
government. South Korea was very fortunate to realize such astounding
economic growth before antitrust laws became the international norm among
trading superpowers, 236 but what about the small and developing countries
today?
Small and developing countries today do not enjoy the option of insulating
their own businesses as South Korea did. Various supranational bodies,
including the WTO, have been pressuring developing countries to liberalize
trade and adopt competition laws, pointing to the writings of academics that
promise a positive relationship between competition law and development.237

233 See Jung & Chang, supra note 224, at 694. See generally Keun S. Lee, Financial Crisis in Korea and
IMF: Analysis and Perspectives, MERILL LYNCH CTR. STUDY INT’L FIN. SERVS. & MKTS. (Feb. 27, 1998),
http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/biz_mlc_lee1.pdf.
234 Jung & Chang, supra note 224, at 707.
235 The market value of each of Korea’s top ten firms exceeded twenty billion, with Samsung Electronics
having a market value of $186.5 billion. Kibo Sim, Top 10 Korean Businesses in the World, FRESHTAX,
http://blog.btrax.com/en/2015/03/23/top-10-korean-businesses-in-the-world-2015/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2017).
In 2014, Samsung Electronics earned the highest global TV market share with 28.3%. SAMSUNG, 2014
SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS ANN. REP. (2014), http://www.samsung.com/common/aboutsamsung/download/
companyreports/2014_E.pdf.
236 This proposition does not impliedly support the Korean chaebol system existing today. It merely
recognizes the advantage chaebols’ growth had on South Korea’s overall economy during its initial stages of
economic development.
237 Dina I. Waked, Competition Law in the Developing World: The Why and How of Adoption and Its
Implications for International Competition Law, 1 GLOBAL ANTITRUST REV. 69, 70–75 (2008).
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In addition, the effects of Hartford Fire, which made the extraterritorial
application of antitrust law more broad, exerted pressure on small and
developing states to adopt their own stringent antitrust laws.238 This leads to
the inference that extraterritorial antitrust laws benefit developed nations with
substantial trade interests, while depriving developing nations of the
opportunity that South Korea had until the 1990s. This too is a theoretical
scenario, but one that scholars and law enforcement must consider when
applying antitrust laws extraterritorially to the possible detriment of developing
countries. The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger and the GE/Honeywell
merger gained public recognition only because they involved two major state
actors. It is doubtful whether smaller and developing countries will benefit
from such publicity when similar merger approvals or prohibitions take place
against them.
V. A RETURN TO INTERNATIONAL COMITY PRINCIPLES
Recognizing the conflicting antitrust laws of various nations, scholars have
tried to address the issue by suggesting a greater convergence through
supranational organizations, such as the WTO. 239 However, those scholars
have failed to consider that cooperation between states towards uniform
antitrust laws is possible only to the extent that all states’ interests converge. In
addition, this solution does not consider the disadvantages that small and
developing economies face. Thus, it is not only unrealistic to have a globalized
antitrust regime, but such a regime would potentially have harmful economic
effects on small and developing countries.
To address the dilemma faced by developing countries, this Comment
suggests that the U.S. courts return to the international comity principles that
were first mentioned in Timberlane, but were practically ignored in the
Hartford Fire majority opinion. Although Hartford Fire did not completely
dismiss the comity principle, it limited its application only to instances when
there is a “true conflict” between domestic and foreign law.240

238

See Working Group Set up by Singapore Ministerial, WORLD TRADE ORG. (2001),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/brief_e/brief13_e.htm. Fifty developing countries
have adopted antitrust laws. Id.
239 See, e.g., Eric Engle, The Globalization of Antitrust and Competition Law, 21 CURRENTS INT’L TRADE
L.J. 3, 13 (2012–2013).
240 Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Calif., 509 U.S. 764, 798.
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However, the principle of comity was not completely ignored by the
Supreme Court. In the Hartford Fire dissent, the late Justice Antonin Scalia
used what he called “prescriptive comity” to limit the application of the
Sherman Act.241 He believed that it was important that the courts consider the
legitimate interests of other countries, albeit without the idea in mind that
extraterritorial application would potentially harm developing countries. 242
These comity principles were assumed to be incorporated into U.S. laws,
having extraterritorial application in the absence of contrary congressional
direction. Thus, according to Justice Scalia, comity considerations were part of
the analysis of whether the Sherman Act prohibited the conduct at issue.
Justice Scalia referred to the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
of the United States to elaborate on how to apply prescriptive comity to the
Sherman Act. 243 The Restatement states that a nation should refrain from
exercising jurisdiction if such jurisdiction is unreasonable, even if it has a basis
for exercising that jurisdiction.244 Justice Scalia listed various factors from the
Restatement to determine whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable,
including the following:
(a) “the extent to which the activity takes place within the
territory [of the regulating state],”245
(b) “the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic
activity, between the regulating state and the person
principally responsible for the activity to be regulated,”246
(c) “the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance
of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which
other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which
the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted,”247
....
(g) “the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity,”248 and

241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248

Id. at 817.
Id. at 820.
See id. at 818–19.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(1) (1987).
Id. § 403(2)(a).
Id. § 403(2)(b).
Id. § 403(2)(c).
Id. § 403(2)(g).
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(h) “the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another
state.”249

The first factor reflects the tension between American Banana and Alcoa,
requiring the balancing between the territoriality and the effects doctrines. The
second factor considers the territoriality and effects doctrines, while also
including the nationality element for balancing. The third, fourth, and fifth
factors are based on comity principles.
These various comity considerations are from a clear-cut rule for deciding
whether to apply extraterritorial jurisdiction. It would be naïve to believe that
any list of factors will provide a clear solution, as evidenced by the increased
confusion caused by the FTAIA. 250 However, it does provide a basic
framework on which the courts and law enforcement can at least begin
considering the negative effects of extraterritorial antitrust application, in
addition to domestic effects. Namely, factor (g) considers the extent of the
other state’s interest in regulating the activity. 251 This factor includes an
analysis of the relative economic effects of the regulation, or absence thereof,
to both the regulating and regulated state.
However, U.S. judges are not economic analysts, and many—if not most—
do not have the necessary economic expertise to conduct such analysis. Thus,
these comity principles should first be adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. This adoption should be
more than merely written guidelines—such as the 1995 Guidelines that listed
factors for comity considerations—and begin to take the form of action.
One may ask why U.S. antitrust laws must reflect the interests of other
states. As the First Circuit said in Nippon Paper, “[c]omity is more an
aspiration than a fixed rule, more a matter of grace than a matter of
obligation.” 252 However, the Second Circuit, in vacating a $147 million
antitrust judgment against two Chinese companies, recently repeated the
Supreme Court’s sentiment that the principle of international comity “is not
249 Id. § 403(2)(h). While the Restatement (Third) lists eight total factors, the most pertinent factors for
this Comment have been listed here.
250 In fact, the First Circuit even refused to give it any weight in deciding whether extraterritorial
application was proper because of the ambiguity of the statute. United States v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., Ltd.,
109 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997) (“The FTAIA is inelegantly phrased and the court in Hartford Fire declined to
place any weight on it. . . . . We emulate this example and do not rest our ultimate conclusion about Section
One’s scope upon the FTAIA.”).
251 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403(2)(e).
252 Id. at 8.
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just a vague political concern favoring international cooperation when it is in
our interest to do so [but r]ather it is a principle under which judicial decisions
reflect the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.” 253 U.S.
antitrust laws, as with competition laws of other states, were promulgated in
reaction to domestic interests to address the public concerns about the trust
problem. 254 Antitrust policy concerned not only consumer welfare, but also
market allocative efficiency, 255 which is why “[m]ost economists agree that
antitrust policy should balance the potential harm from greater concentration of
market power with the benefits offered by large enterprises with economies of
scale.” 256 The United States took this approach to a highly pragmatic level
during World War I, when it took antitrust enforcement actions against
German agents, but relaxed antitrust enforcement against domestic entities to
bolster its economy.257 Thus, antitrust law and its enforcement were accurately
tailored to the domestic needs of the United States. These antitrust laws, once
tailored to domestic interests, are now being applied extraterritorially to further
fit the needs of the nation within the context of a globalizing economy.
Therefore, should not U.S. antitrust policies also begin to consider consumer
welfare and market efficiencies within the global context? Studies about
antitrust laws and their implications to developing countries have usually
focused on the form antitrust laws should take and their enforcement
limitations. Little to no work has been done to address the potential
disadvantages developing countries face before extraterritorial enforcement of
antitrust laws. Thus, further detailed research and analysis concerning the
market effects on developing countries caused by extraterritorial enforcement
of antitrust laws should be conducted.

253 Animal Sci. Prods. v. Hebei Welcome Pharm. Co. (In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation), 837 F.3d
175, 183 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for Southern
Dist., 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987)) (alteration in original). Though the Second Circuit’s decision is commendable
for its impartiality, the principle of international comity was applied because the defendants could not comply
with both U.S. and Chinese antitrust laws because they were in conflict with each other. Id. at 192. This is
consistent with the limitations set by Hartford Fire. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Calif., 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
This Comment argues that such a limited application is insufficient, and that the U.S. courts and legislature
should consider the economic disadvantages posed to small and developing countries when deciding a case
and passing laws.
254 Arthur, supra note 6, at 446–47.
255 Daniel A. Crane, The Economics of Antitrust Enforcement, in ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 2
(Keith N. Hylton ed., 2010); Steven J. Markovich, U.S. Antitrust Policy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Feb. 6,
2014), http://www.cfr.org/corporate-regulation/us-antitrust-policy/p29984.
256 Markovich, supra note 255.
257 See supra text accompanying notes 38–41.
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CONCLUSION
The United States was the first to apply its antitrust laws extraterritorially,
becoming one of the most active global enforcers of its antitrust laws. Others,
including Brazil, the EU, Japan, and South Korea soon followed, creating an
environment that accepts extraterritorial application of stringent antitrust laws
as the international norm. Small and developing countries have thus been
pressured to accept foreign enforcement and promulgate their own laws that
emulate those of the United States and the EU This may have potentially
negative effects on the economies of smaller and developing countries, even
taking away the opportunities of economic growth that South Korea was able
to enjoy. However, the history of U.S. and South Korean antitrust laws, as well
as the conflict in the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger, reveal that state
interest is one of the main impetuses of antitrust promulgation and
enforcement. With this assumption in mind, U.S. courts and antitrust
enforcement agencies must restore the international comity principles that
Justice Scalia referred to as “prescriptive comity” in his Hartford Fire
dissent. 258 This prescriptive comity must consider the negative potential
consequences that extraterritorial antitrust application may have on certain
small and developing countries. Again, little study has been conducted in this
matter, and efforts to consider comity principles of smaller and developing
states should begin with research and analysis of the actual effects of
extraterritorial antitrust laws on these states.
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